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The Misperception of Inflation by 
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The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin
Abstract:  Perceptions and forecasts of  inflation have the potential to impact on a range of
economic outcomes. We reveal large, systematic overestimation of inflation by Irish consumers,
which varies by social group. In contrast to previous work in this area, our models suggest the
upward bias and the variation by social group should be considered substantially separate
phenomena. We also offer evidence that inflation misperceptions are linked to attitudes and
intentions with respect to consumption and saving and, hence, are likely to affect household
decision-making. The findings therefore raise issues regarding the relationship between financial
literacy and consumer behaviour. 
I INTRODUCTION
P
erceptions and forecasts of inflation have the potential to affect a variety
of economic outcomes. At an individual level, accurate estimates of
inflation are important when undertaking major financial decisions, such as
taking out a loan or investing in a pension plan, as well as for ongoing
financial management of personal savings, consumption and credit. In the
wider economy, systematic influences on estimates of inflation can be expected
to affect wage negotiations, consumer confidence and the transmission of
monetary policy.
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Quay, Dublin 2, Ireland; tel. +353 1 863 2000.We show that, despite its importance for economic decision-making, the
large majority of people in Ireland overestimate price rises substantially.
Between 2002 and 2007, less than 15 per cent of the population perceived
inflation to be within two percentage points of its actual value, as measured
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Our aim is to offer a contribution to
understanding this systematic misperception of price changes and to give an
indication of why mis  perceptions may matter. We reveal significant variation
in the accuracy of perceptions by social group and show that the misperception
of inflation is associated with attitudes and intentions regarding future
consumption and saving. In other words, certain sections of society perceive
inflation less accurately than others and an initial analysis suggests that their
mistaken reading has behavioural consequences. 
II  RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In both theoretical and applied macroeconomics, expected (as distinct from
perceived) inflation is considered to be an important variable. It features in a
wide range of macroeconomic models and appears regularly in the public
statements of central banks. Especially following Lucas (1973) and the
“rational expectations revolution”, there have been a number of attempts to
gauge the accuracy of people’s expectations and, to a lesser extent, perceptions
of inflation (e.g. Fama, 1975; De Menil and Bhalla, 1975; Carlson, 1977;
Jonung, 1981; Jonung and Laidler, 1988). Large errors have been recorded for
both. Expectations and perceptions are very strongly correlated (0.735 in our
own data), suggesting that the errors in expectations are related to
misperceptions of current inflation. This section briefly reviews the findings,
the hypotheses advanced to explain them and their relevance for the present
paper.
The accuracy of people’s expectations and perceptions depends on the
medium-term inflation climate. During the 1970s, when inflation was high,
the expectations of both the general public and professional economists tended
to be too low. Thereafter, expectations of inflation have been too high. The
errors in people’s estimates display both serial correlation and correlation with
other publicly available information, such as interest rates and unemployment
(Thomas, 1999). Jonung and Laidler (1988; see also Jonung, 1981) confirmed
the same result for inflation perceptions, measured over an inflation cycle in
Sweden: mean perceptions followed a smoother path over the cycle than actual
inflation. This finding (and others since) rules out the possibility that the
primary cause of biased inflation expectations is rational consideration of
future probabilistic events that fail to occur, or the “Peso problem” (Friedman
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current inflation. 
The scale of the bias is considerable. Reviewing literature between 1981
and 2008, a period of generally low and stable inflation in developed
economies, Ranyard et al. (2008) conclude that mean perceptions of inflation
are generally higher than official figures by several percentage points and
sometimes by over ten percentage points (e.g. Bates and Gabor, 1986). In the
first instance, our analysis tests for the presence and scale of overestimation
in Ireland. 
Perceptions and expectations of inflation also vary considerably by social
group. In the US, the mean inflation perceptions of women, younger people,
people of lower educational attainment, single people and members of
minorities, are higher than those of other social groups (Bryan and Venkatu,
2001a; 2001b). Similar differences by gender and socioeconomic group have
been reported in Austria (Fluch and Stix, 2007) and Italy (Malgarini, 2008).
One possible explanation is that different social groups tend to buy different
products (Jonung, 1981). However, perceptual differences have been recorded
too consistently across time periods and nations for genuine price movements
among different product categories to account for them. 
Our data consists of a large sample and sufficiently detailed background
information to permit a more extensive multivariate analysis of inflation
perceptions across social groups. It is generally assumed that whatever
underlies the tendency to overestimate inflation also underlies these
intergroup differences (e.g. Bryan and Venkatu, 2001b; Ranyard et al., 2008).
We test this assumption. The distribution of inflation perceptions for all social
groups is subject to a strong right-skew. Hence, it may be the case, for
instance, that women have a higher mean perception and yet are more likely
also to underestimate inflation. With a strongly skewed distribution,
intergroup differences may be due to a group possessing a stronger upward
bias, or to that group perceiving inflation less accurately among a population
where the perception of all groups is skewed. We test this by employing an
original modelling approach to inflation perceptions.
It is more difficult to distinguish empirically between the various
hypotheses proposed to explain people’s overestimation of inflation. Jonung
(1981) argues that people may be influenced by their past experience, such
that those who have lived through periods of higher inflation tend to have an
upward bias. In Ireland between 2002 and 2007, this hypothesis predicts
lower estimates of inflation among younger adults and is therefore one
hypothesis we test directly. A range of psychological biases have also been put
forward to explain overestimation of inflation, which are harder to test with
survey data. Most rest on the idea that consumers’ perceptions are a weighted
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cite Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) “availability” heuristic, suggesting that
biases may result if consumers can more easily recall frequent, recent and
larger price changes. Brachinger (2008) applies Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) to inflation perceptions, arguing that because price
increases are felt as losses they are weighted more heavily than gains
associated with equivalent price decreases. Lastly, systematic biases in the
way past prices are remembered may play a part (e.g. Kemp, 1987;
Brachinger, 2008). 
In addition to personal experience of transactions, media reports of official
inflation figures appear to be a significant but modest influence. On the one
hand, awareness of official figures is relatively low: recent surveys in Austria
and Italy found that a minority of people could provide an estimate of official
inflation (Fluch and Stix, 2007; Malgarini, 2008), while three-quarters of
Italians incorrectly believed consumer durables were excluded from official
calculations. On the other hand, people who are aware of official figures do
have, on average, more accurate perceptions, although they remain inclined to
overestimate. Soroka (2006) provides evidence for a “social amplification”
effect, whereby the greater inclination of the media to report upwards rather
than downwards movements of inflation pushes perceptions upwards. Thus,
some input to perceptions from official figures is likely, although it too may
contribute upward bias.
Our analysis cannot distinguish between these competing, or perhaps
complimentary, hypotheses. Nevertheless, the more comprehensive analysis
by social group we offer is suggestive of reasons why some groups may have
more accurate perceptions than others. Furthermore, if inflation perceptions
are linked to economic behaviour, then the existence of large differences
between social groups raises concerns about how variation in financial literacy
may affect economic outcomes (Braunstein and Welch, 2002; de Meza,
Irlenbusch and Reyniers, 2008).
A final relevant strand of empirical literature concerns the impact on
perceived inflation of the 2002 Euro cash changeover. Perceived inflation rose
sharply across the whole Euro Area for several years following the cash
changeover, despite stable and low inflation (see Dohring and Mordonu, 2007,
for review). The origin of this striking phenomenon remains a puzzle and the
present study does not directly address possible explanations, which are the
subject of a separate paper (in preparation). However, the phenomenon is
relevant in two respects. First, any theory of what drives the distribution of
individual inflation perceptions may shed light on why this large step jump in
perceptions occurred. Second, the data for the present study were gathered
during the period when inflation perceptions in Ireland were strongly affected
by the cash changeover, so it may be an important influence.
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share, is the belief that they are likely to affect individual economic decisions.
Yet whether misperceptions do indeed have an impact on economic decision-
making has been much less explored (Ranyard et al., 2008), as few studies
have examined links between economic perceptions and economic behaviour at
an individual level. Katona (1975) showed that an index of consumer
sentiment was linked to consumption behaviour, providing some evidence that
people’s general economic outlook affects their economic decisions. Our data
allow us to explore a more specific behavioural link, by relating the extent of
misperception of inflation to attitudes and intentions regarding consumption
and saving. 
III DATA
The data for the analysis are drawn from the EU Consumer Survey for
Ireland. Each month a representative sample of adults aged 16 and over was
contacted by telephone based on a random stratified sampling procedure. The
completed monthly sample was usually around 1,350-1,400 questionnaires,
with interviewing taking place from 60 randomly selected sampling points
throughout Ireland. The data is re-weighted for regional location, household
size and respondent characteristics. The usual response rate was approxi  -
mately 57 per cent. Prior to 2002, the survey asked consumers about their
perception and expectation regarding the direction of price changes, but did
not attempt to measure the magnitude of that change; the perceived or
expected inflation rate. From July 2002, however, the price questions in the
survey were expanded to ask about the magnitude of perceived changes in
prices over the last 12 months, as well as expectations for price changes over
the coming 12 months. Following Jonung and Laidler (1988), the main
variable of interest is perceived inflation, which is obtained from the survey
question:
By what per cent do you think that prices have increased/decreased in the
last 12 months?
Respondents are not prompted or required to select from a range of
responses – the question is open-ended.1 The dataset available for this
analysis covers the period July 2002 to December 2007. This provides us with
a total dataset of 76,715 respondents, of which 66 per cent provided an
estimate for the current rate of inflation. 
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1 This is in contrast to the University of Michigan and ISAE (Italy) where confirmation is
sought if the answer exceeds a certain level. We first consider how consumers perceived the direction of price change.
Table 1 presents consumers’ perceptions on an annual basis. Over the period,
the CPI completed a cycle (right column), beginning and ending with inflation
at just under five per cent, falling to just over two in the middle. The bulk of
consumers throughout the period perceived that prices had risen. Over 30 per
cent thought that prices were “very much higher” and 35 per cent responded
that prices were “quite a bit higher”. However, the proportion of consumers
who responded that prices were “very much” higher declined, from nearly one
in two consumers in 2002 to less than one in five by 2007, despite the fact that
inflation as measured by the CPI was largely unchanged. This pattern of
falling qualitative perceptions, beginning at what was in fact an historical
high, is typical of inflation perceptions across the Euro Area for the period
following the cash changeover (Dohring and Mordonu, 2007).
Table 1: Mean Perception of Prices Compared with 12 Months Ago
Very Much Quite a Bit A Little About the Lower Total Mean
Higher Higher Higher Same CPI
%
2002* 48.9 31.7 16.4 2.8 0.1 100 4.6
2003 45.7 32.4 17.9 3.6 0.4 100 3.5
2004 32.7 37.1 23.4 5.9 0.9 100 2.2
2005 28.1 34.9 28.6 7.7 0.8 100 2.4
2006 22.1 37.7 30.5 8.9 0.9 100 4.0
2007 18.4 38.9 32.1 10.1 0.5 100 4.9
Total 32.5 35.5 24.9 6.5 0.6 100 3.5
* Six months from July-December.
We next turn to quantitative estimates of inflation. Consistent with
previous findings in other countries, respondents substantially overstated
price rises. Overall, the mean estimate by consumers for the current rate of
inflation was 13.2 per cent, compared with a mean of 3.5 per cent for the
official measure of annual inflation. Figure 1 shows that overestimation was
fairly consistent. Although the average estimate declined over the period, it
remained substantially above the official record of inflation. Across this five-
and-a-half year period of relatively low and stable inflation, less than 15 per
cent of the population perceived inflation to be within 2 percentage points of
its actual value, as measured by the CPI. Although the proportion estimating
inflation within this range increased across the period, as the euro changeover
effect diminished, the figure was still less than 20 per cent in 2007. The large
144 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWmajority of the population misperceives inflation, believing prices to be rising
much faster than the official figure records.
Figure 1: Inflation Perceptions: Survey Data Compared to the CPI
Sources: CSO and EU Consumer Survey.
Table 2 reports the mean inflation perceptions for a number of different
demographic and socioeconomic groups. Again, the pattern is consistent with
previous findings. Current inflation is significantly and substantially
overestimated by all groups, although it is evident that differences between
groups exist. For example, the mean estimate of male respondents is 10.7 per
cent, compared to a mean estimate of 15.4 per cent for female respondents.
Inflation perceptions fall as educational attainment rises. Over the period in
question the mean estimate of current inflation for those with a primary
school education or lower is 16.1 per cent, while those with a third-level
education or above estimate inflation at 10.6 per cent. 
It is particularly interesting to note that of the work status categories,
those working in home duties have the highest inflation perception, at 17 per
cent. Assuming that the frequency of making purchases contributes to the
formation of perceptions and that those in home duties do the majority of the
household shopping, this finding can be considered quite surprising –
housewives have the least accurate perception of price changes, at least in our
data. One possibility is that whatever psychological mechanism underlies the
upward bias is actually strengthened by frequent purchases. It is worth
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duties is also higher. It is not clear, based on the psychological biases proposed
to explain overestimation of inflation (Bates and Gabor, 1986; Kemp, 1987;
Brachinger, 2008), why a group with greater purchase frequency would have
more dispersed perceptions. An alternative possibility is that those in home
duties are less likely to be influenced by official figures, increasing both the
bias and dispersion of perceptions. The final column of Table 2 suggests a
relationship between the standard deviation and the mean, as one might
expect with a skewed distribution. As suggested in the previous section,
therefore, the differences between the groups may amount to more than the
observation that some groups overestimate inflation by a greater amount. 
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Table 2: Inflation Perceptions by Demographic and Socioeconomic Group
Year 2002* 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total Std. Dev
(2002-07)
Male 12.9 12.4 10.1 9.7 10.1 9.0 10.7 12.1
Female 18.2 19.0 14.6 14.2 14.2 12.0 15.4 16.3
Primary 18.4 18.9 15.2 15.0 14.5 13.5 16.1 17.7
Junior Cert 16.7 17.4 14.1 14.1 13.8 11.6 14.7 15.8
Leaving/Other 2nd Level 15.9 16.3 12.8 12.2 13.1 11.4 13.7 14.7
Third Level 13.4 12.8 10.0 9.7 10.0 8.6 10.6 11.7
Working 14.6 14.6 11.8 11.1 11.7 9.9 12.3 13.5
Retired 14.5 14.9 10.8 11.0 10.8 10.9 12.0 14.6
Home Duties 20.3 21.2 16.0 15.7 15.0 12.8 17.0 17.3
Other 14.3 14.8 11.7 12.8 13.6 10.7 13.0 14.8
Married/Couple 16.1 16.1 12.4 12.3 12.5 10.6 13.3 14.5
Single etc. 14.8 15.4 12.6 11.5 11.9 10.8 12.9 14.8
16-29 Years 14.6 14.4 12.1 11.1 11.3 9.4 12.4 13.7
30-49 Years 16.0 16.1 12.5 12.4 13.0 10.7 13.4 14.3
50-64 Years 16.0 16.4 12.9 11.7 12.6 11.0 13.4 15.2
65+ Years 15.2 15.9 12.0 12.6 10.9 10.7 12.8 15.3
Income Quartile 1 16.8 19.6 14.9 14.4 13.5 13.6 15.8 17.5
Income Quartile 2 18.2 17.4 13.8 14.6 14.2 12.4 14.9 16.3
Income Quartile 3 16.9 15.5 12.4 12.6 13.7 11.3 13.4 14.9
Income Quartile 4 14.6 16.9 10.0 8.6 9.4 8.6 11.2 12.1
All 15.6 15.9 12.5 12.1 12.3 10.6 13.2 14.6
Mean CPI 4.6 3.5 2.2 2.4 3.9 5.0 3.5 1.2
* Six months from July.The full distribution is shown in Figure 2. There is a clear tendency of the
estimates towards salient values. Respondents are drawn towards round
numbers, especially prominent ones, such that in the distribution of estimates
there are “spikes” at round numbers and particularly those that are divisible
by five. This is not uncommon. Bryan and Palmqvist (2005) report a similar
finding for survey data on inflation expectations in the US and Sweden. Curtin
(2005) finds “digit preference” in the Michigan survey data.2 This is an
important consideration when it comes to assessing the usefulness of the
quantitative estimates and how best to model them. While the new question
on the survey elicits greater useful variation between respondents and
generates a more precise estimate of the misperception of inflation relative to
its value as measured by the CPI, it also introduces a degree of measurement
error resulting from a bias towards salient numbers.
The strong right-skew is evident in Figure 2. Perceived inflation in fact
ranges from – 70 per cent to 100 per cent, although these extreme estimates
are a very small proportion of overall responses. The upper tail of the
distribution is nevertheless quite long: just over one quarter of responses are
over 20 per cent. In contrast, the lower tail of the distribution is truncated,
with just 0.6 per cent of consumers perceiving falling prices. Analysis of the
interquartile range reveals that half of the respondents perceive inflation to be
between 5 and 20 per cent. The mode of the distribution is 10 per cent, cited
by 17.9 per cent of replies. Nearly 10 per cent perceived prices to be unchanged
– a zero inflation rate. This is difficult to explain, as the official measure of
inflation shows that since January 1990, inflation has ranged from 1 per cent
to 7 per cent. It could be that these consumers perceive inflation to be very low
and so round their estimate to zero. Alternatively it may result from the fact
that the prices of many goods do not change regularly. If these goods make up
all of a consumer’s purchases then that consumer would perceive inflation to
be zero.
It is worth asking what the historical distribution of the CPI looks like in
reality, since one possible influence on perceptions is historical experience
(Jonung, 1981) and there is some evidence over long time periods that infla  -
tion expectations display regression towards the historical mean (Thomas,
1999). The two panels of Figure 3 provide the distributions of the monthly CPI
for Ireland for two time periods, January 1977 – August 2008 and January
1990 – August 2008. Hence, one can think of these distributions as represent  -
ing the different inflation histories experienced by younger and older adults.
It is notable that both distributions, like the distributions of estimates
themselves, have a strong right skew. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Consumer’s Inflation Perceptions
*A small proportion of inflation perceptions, 0.07 per cent, are less than -10 but are not
included in the graph.
*  
Figure 3: Distribution of CPI for Two Time PeriodsGiven this, if consumers have any uncertainty about present inflation and
employ history as a guide, it makes sense that their guess is generally higher
than the prevailing CPI, since the mean of the historical distribution of the
CPI is above its median. For our first period, 1977 to 2008, the difference
between the mean and median is quite wide, with a mean of 5.9 and a median
of 3.9. The gap narrows for the second period, 1990 to 2008, when the mean is
3.1 and the median is 2.8. Historical influences may therefore bias perceptions
upwards. On the other hand, the hypothesis that older people’s perceptions
will have a stronger upward bias is neither confirmed in Table 2 nor in the
multivariate analysis that follows. Still, this skew in the distribution of the
CPI itself remains a potential factor in the overestimation of inflation.
IV  DETERMINANTS OF ACCURATE INFLATION PERCEPTIONS
The development of an appropriate multivariate model to explore the
determinants of quantitative inflation perceptions is econometrically
challenging. Initially we attempted to assess the accuracy of perceptions by
modelling the magnitude of the error. However, the skew of the distribution
and the clumps of observations at salient values, including a zero inflation
rate, resulted in a poor fit. Malgarini (2008) employs least squares estimation
to model the estimate (as distinct from error), but we find such an approach
results in highly non-spherical errors, as again might be expected given the
unusual nature of the distribution of estimates. We also explored the
possibility of estimation via generalised least squares, but because the error
distribution is both highly skewed and subject to extreme values in each tail,
it does not conform easily to a known distribution. Note also that the quantity
and systematic nature of the extreme observations is such that it is not clear
that they can be treated as outliers. 
Our approach is instead to categorise the quantitative estimates. This
allows us to distinguish between accurate responses, underestimations and
overestimations of different magnitudes, such that the determinants of each
can be considered separately. The obvious downside is that categorisation
throws away variation.3 Furthermore, there remains a question regarding the
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which was introduced to the survey in 2002, being no more analytically useful than the pre-
existing qualitative one. However, using the categorical qualitative indicator as the dependent
variable and employing the same model as is presented in this section produces a clearly inferior
fit (including when the sample is limited only to respondents who were able to provide a
quantitative estimate). Hence, although variation is discarded, the categories based on the
quantitative indicator appear to be more systematically related to the explanatory variables than
those arising from the qualitative indicator.appropriate model to use. Christensen, van Els and van Rooij (2006), who also
categorised quantitative estimates, employed ordered probit analysis. As
described in Section II, however, the overestimation of perceived inflation and
the accuracy of perception. It is hence questionable whether categories
ranging from underestimation, through relatively accurate perception, to
overestimation, are best considered as ordered categories for the purposes of
examining what drives inflation perceptions. Our view is that rather than an
ordered regression model, a non-ordered multinomial model may be more
appropriate. 
Indeed, whether significant explanatory variables are better thought of as
associated with higher estimates or less accurate estimates is a testable
hypothesis. We employ a multinomial logistic regression model in which the
dependent variable has three categories: “underestimation” by more than 1
percentage point relative to the CPI; “accurate” estimation, within a band
from 1 percentage point below to 2 percentage points above the CPI
(inclusive); and “overestimation” by more than 2 percentage points.4 The
“accurate” category forms the reference for the dependent variable and we
therefore present coefficients and odds ratios that estimate separately the
association between the explanatory variables and the likelihood of
underestimating or overestimating inflation. If a given explanatory variable,
such as gender or socioeconomic status, is associated with higher perceived
inflation, we would predict that the coefficient on that variable should be
positive when comparing the likelihood of overestimation relative to accurate
perception, but negative when comparing the likelihood of underestimation
relative to accurate perception. If, instead, the given variable is associated
with less accurate inflation perception, the coefficients for both sections of the
model should have the same positive sign.5
A broad range of standard background variables is available from the EU
Consumer Survey for inclusion in the model: gender, age (7 categories),
educational attainment (5 categories), income quartile, marital status (6
categories) and occupational class (8 categories). In addition, dummy variables
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4 We skew the band defining accurate perception in approximate accordance with the skew of the
distribution of the monthly CPI, as described in Section III. In fact, our results are largely
insensitive to the definition of “accurate” and to this asymmetry. For example, the coefficients are
very similar if the “accurate” category is defined as perceptions falling within 2 percentage points
either side of the CPI, although the model is a marginally poorer fit. 
5 Although the category for perception exceeding the CPI by more than 2 percentage points
includes over half the respondents who gave an estimate, our results are not sensitive to the
number of dependent variable categories. Further categorisation of the overestimates into modest
and larger values (between 2 and 5 percentage points and those higher still, or 2 and 10
percentage points and those higher still) does not alter the coefficients significantly. Hence, we
report the more parsimonious three category model.for time (65 monthly dummies) are included in order to control for the effect of
the Euro changeover (and other time specific effects). In line with the
international evidence, the coefficients on the dummy variables display
statistically significant variation over time that is consistent with the
changeover having induced higher inflation perceptions. The coefficients for
the likelihood of overestimation decrease with time, while for underestimation
they increase (not shown). 
The multinomial regression model is presented in Table 3. Coefficients and
odds ratios relating to the likelihood of underestimating inflation are provided
in the left-hand columns and those relating to overestimation are given in the
right-hand columns. Consistent with previous findings, there is a strong and
significant association between socioeconomic and socio-demographic
characteristics and the perception of inflation. However, the pattern in Table
3 offers a substantially different interpretation to that suggested previously
(Bryan and Venkatu, 2001a, 2001b; Christensen, van Els and van Rooij, 2006;
Fluch and Stix, 2007; Malgarini, 2008).
Considering first the likelihood of overestimation, women and those under
the age of 50 are significantly more likely to perceive inflation to be well above
the CPI. There are also strong effects of educational attainment and income,
with those in lower socioeconomic groups more likely to overestimate. These
coefficients are in keeping with previous findings. We also note, however, the
role of marital status. Single people are less likely than married people to
overestimate inflation. It is tempting to interpret this finding as relating to
the increased likelihood that single people manage their own household
finances, although other interpretations may be possible. The significant
coefficient for cohabitees is consistent with this interpretation, since they are
more likely to have recently been single. Lastly with respect to overestimation,
higher occupational classes are less likely to perceive inflation well above the
CPI, although the interesting exception to this is those in the “unskilled
manual” category, who are also less likely to overestimate (relative to the
“skilled manual” reference category). One possible reason for this could be the
greater likelihood that people in this category receive benefit payments, the
annual increments for which may focus attention on inflation. We
unfortunately have no way to test this hypothesis with the present data and
other interpretations are again possible. 
Although different in certain nuances, the right hand columns of Table 3
look not unlike previous multivariate analyses of inflation perceptions. The
left hand columns, however, represent a departure. If gender, age and
socioeconomic status drive the perception of inflation upwards, the coefficients
for the likelihood of significant underestimation of inflation should be of the
opposite sign to those for overestimation. They are not. Instead, it is clear that
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Table 3: Multinomial Regression for Accuracy of Quantitative Inflation
Estimate
Dependent Variable Reference Underestimation Overestimation
Accurate (–1% <Error < 2%) (Error < –1%) (Error >2%)
β (s.e.) exp (β) β (s.e.) exp (β)
Intercept –0.869*** 0.347***
(0.141) (0.106)
Female 0.167*** 1.182 0.498*** 1.646
(0.036) (0.027)
Age (40-49 Years)
16-19 0.079 1.083 –0.115 0.891
(0.145) (0.110)
20-29 0.104 1.109 0.041 1.042
(0.074) (0.056)
30-39 0.044 1.045 0.018 1.019
(0.054) (0.040)
50-59 –0.092* 0.913 –0.206*** 0.814
(0.054) (0.040)
60-69 –0.085 0.918 –0.263*** 0.769
(0.074) (0.057)




Primary 0.280*** 1.323 0.417*** 1.518
(0.074) (0.057)
Lower Second Level 0.058 1.059 0.204*** 1.226
(0.060) (0.046)
Higher Second Level 0.105** 1.111 0.190*** 1.210
(0.050) (0.038)
Other Second Level –0.090 0.914 0.003 1.003
(0.063) (0.046)
Income (Top Quartile)
Bottom Quartile 0.554*** 1.740 0.657*** 1.707
(0.080) (0.062)
2nd Quartile 0.416*** 1.517 0.584*** 1.792
(0.058) (0.044)
3rd Quartile 0.261*** 1.299 0.422*** 1.525
(0.045) (0.034)
Marital Status (Married)
Cohabiting 0.058 1.060 –0.190** 0.827
(0.094) (0.074)THE MISPERCEPTION OF INFLATION BY IRISH CONSUMERS 153
Table 3: Multinomial Regression for Accuracy of Quantitative Inflation
Estimate (Contd.)
Dependent Variable Reference Underestimation Overestimation
Accurate (–1% <Error < 2%) (Error < –1%) (Error >2%)
β (s.e.) exp (β) β (s.e.) exp (β)
Separated 0.029 1.030 –0.112 0.894
(0.107) (0.082)*
Widowed 0.135* 1.145 –0.105 0.900
(0.076) (0.060)
Divorced –0.079 0.924 –0.084 0.919
(0.170) (0.129)
Never Married 0.039 1.040 –0.199*** 0.820
(0.053) (0.041)
Occupational Class (Skilled Manual)
Professional/Manager –0.028 0.973 –0.171*** 0.843
(0.058) (0.044)
Non-Manual –0.061 0.941 –0.165*** 0.847
(0.059) (0.045)
Self-Employed 0.255*** 1.291 –0.002 0.998
(0.067) (0.052)
Farmer –0.076 0.927 0.015 1.015
(0.083) (0.062)
Unskilled Manual –0.037 0.963 –0.170*** 0.844
(0.075) (0.057)
Never Worked –0.165 0.848 –0.255* 0.775
(0.170) (0.133)
Other –0.165 0.848 0.145 1.156
(0.174) (0.128)
Monthly Dummies YES YES
N 41,500
–2 Log Likelihood 55690.134
Nagelkerke R2 0.130
* p < 0.1;  ** p < 0.05;  *** p < 0.01 (p-values for Wald test of βi = 0).
women and those of lower educational attainment and income, as well as
being more likely to overestimate inflation, are also more likely to
underestimate it. The coefficients for age also maintain their sign, although
they are non-significant, as are the coefficients for marital status.
Occupational status is also largely non-significant with respect to
underestimation, although the self-employed appear to be particularly likely
to underestimate inflation – a result we find hard to interpret. The mean and variance of a skewed distribution are not independent.
Hence, if there is reason for estimates of inflation to be skewed upwards across
all social groups, then those groups with less accurate estimates will have
higher mean estimates also. Thus, the results presented here suggest that the
association between inflation perceptions and social groups is more subtle
than previously thought. It is true that women, younger people and those in
lower socioeconomic groups perceive, on average, prices to be rising faster
than do men, older people and those in higher socioeconomic groups. However,
in addition to being more inclined to overestimate inflation, these groups are
also more inclined to underestimate it. Certain groups are perhaps not so
much inclined to perceive higher inflation as to perceive it less accurately in a
world where everyone tends to overestimate it.
V  DO MISPERCEPTIONS OF INFLATION AFFECT ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOUR?
Although the misperception of inflation is systematic and sizeable, it is
possible that it is ultimately of little economic significance. There is no
guarantee that even large inaccuracies in the perception of price changes have
an impact on ongoing household financial decisions. 
It is straightforward to generate contrasting hypotheses for how
misperceptions might affect behaviour. One possibility is that those who
perceive inflation to be high might also perceive real interest rates to be low
and may hence be less likely to save and more likely to borrow and spend.
Alternatively, it is also possible that individuals who perceive higher inflation
will be less likely to spend. Their perception of high inflation may be
influenced by their perception of changes in their own real incomes, such that
higher inflation implies lower affordability. More simply, if they believe the
present period is one of high inflation, this may translate into a perception of
poor value for money. It is possible to question the economic rationality of each
of these possible behavioural responses, depending on different assumptions
about past and future prices and income. Hence, while the direction of the
relationship between perceived inflation and consumption is an empirical
question, it should be borne in mind that its empirical answer could be subject
to change over time, just as the relationship between actual and perceived
inflation is (see Section II). 
Naturally, we would ideally like to have data relating to individual
economic decisions, such as actual consumption and saving levels or
engagement with various financial services. Although falling short of this
ideal, the EU Consumer Survey nevertheless contains two useful questions
154 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWrelating to attitudes, which ask about the advisability of buying and saving in
the present economic climate, plus three questions relating to behavioural
intentions, which ask about household spending plans over the next year, the
intention to buy a car (within the next two years) and the intention to buy a
house (within the next two years). While we cannot be sure that these
indicators are related to subsequent behaviour, it is nevertheless a reasonable
contention. Should there prove to be an association between the misperception
of inflation and attitudes or behavioural intentions regarding consumption
and saving, it would be consistent with the view that misperception of price
changes has at least some economic consequences. 
Dealing first with the attitudinal questions, the survey asks with respect
to buying “large items of household equipment, such as furniture, washing
machines, TV sets etc.” whether “for people in general the present time is a
good time to buy; neither a good time or a bad time; or a bad time to buy – the
purchase should be postponed”. Hence, the wording of the question makes
clear that the answer carries behavioural advice about whether or not to make
large purchases. We construct a binary variable from this question, assigning
a 1 to respondents (25.5 per cent) who say it’s a good time to buy and 0 to the
rest. The question about saving simply asks whether, in view of the general
economic situation, it is “a reasonable time to save”. We assign the value 1 to
respondents (65.7 per cent) who replied that it was “certainly” or “perhaps” a
good time to save and 0 to those who said it was “probably not” or “certainly
not” a good time to save.
We employ these two variables as dependent variables in logistic
regression models, where the null hypothesis is that they will be unaffected by
perceptions of inflation. Obviously, given the significant relationships
uncovered in Section III, it is important to control for relevant socio-
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. We therefore include the same
explanatory variables as for the previous multinomial model, as well as the
monthly dummy variables. 
One might argue that the regression of an attitude on a perception is
mediated more by personal psychological factors than by a link between what
people observe and how they subsequently behave. For instance, someone who
feels pessimistic about the economy (or is inclined to be negative generally)
might be more likely to give a negative answer to both a question about
inflation and a question about the benefit of spending or saving. We cannot
control for personality. However, recall that the inflation question on the
survey asked respondents to estimate a percentage figure, not to evaluate a
statement or express a point of view. Furthermore, another survey question
allows us to control for individual economic outlook. Respondents were asked
how the “general economic situation will develop”, with five categories ranging
THE MISPERCEPTION OF INFLATION BY IRISH CONSUMERS 155from “get a lot better” to “get a lot worse”. This control variable ought to pick
up variation in pessimism. The possibility of other unobserved personality
traits influencing both perceptions of prices over the past year and attitudes
to future economic behaviour cannot be ruled out, however. 
Table 4 presents coefficients and odds ratios relating to inflation
perceptions and pessimism from logistic regression models for both attitudinal
dependent variables.6 Looking at the left hand model, people who
underestimate inflation are substantially more likely to agree that the present
is a good time to make large household purchases, while those who
overestimate it are less likely to agree with this. The gradient in the
coefficients is consistent and highly significant. The gradient in the
coefficients for economic sentiment is also strong and highly significant.
Turning to the right hand model, overestimation of inflation is significant for
attitudes towards saving too, with those who overestimate inflation being less
inclined to think it is a good time to save. 
One could argue that these models present a somewhat contradictory
picture, since overestimation of inflation is associated with negative attitudes
to both consumption and saving, while money must be either spent or saved.
However, it must be borne in mind that these questions are about attitudes. It
is not contradictory to believe both that inflation is such that it is likely to
erode savings (i.e. that the real interest rate is low) and that price changes
have reduced affordability or resulted in poor value for money. It is simply that
the likely behavioural consequences of these attitudes are in opposition to one
another and will to some degree, therefore, balance each other out. The net
effect on decision-making with respect to consumption and saving we cannot
know, but misperceptions of inflation appear to be associated with relevant
attitudes.
The three answers to survey questions on behavioural intentions are
similarly recoded as binary responses and employed as dependent variables in
logistic regression models. For the first model, we assign the value 1 to
respondents (30.6 per cent) who said they were planning to spend less on
household items over the next 12 months, the value 0 to those planning to
spend the same or more. Two more variables for the intention to buy a car and
a house are constructed such that those respondents who stated that they
would “perhaps” or “certainly” buy a car (house) over the next two years are
given the value 1 (34.7 per cent for car purchase, 18.9 per cent for house
purchase), otherwise the value 0. 
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6 For ease of explanation, full models including coefficients for all regressors are not shown here,
but are available from the authors on request.Rather than asking respondents about how people generally ought to take
economic decisions at the time of the interview, the questions used to construct
these dependent variables ask specifically about the behaviour of the
respondent’s household over the coming period. Hence, in addition to concerns
mentioned above about the influence of general economic pessimism on the
response, we also control for the individual’s level of optimism or pessimism
with respect to their own household. An extra categorical control variable is
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Table 4: Logistic Regression for Attitudes to Consumption and Saving
Good Time to Buy Good Time to Save
β (s.e.) exp (β) β (s.e.) exp (β)
Sociodemographic Controls







Underestimate (>1% pts.  0.161*** 1.175 –0.067* 0.936
below CPI) (0.029) (0.036)
Modest Overestimate –0.078** 0.925 –0.148*** 0.863
(≥2% pts. above CPI) (0.029) (0.030)
Large Overestimate –0.347*** 0.707 –0.405*** 0.667
(>10% pts. above CPI) (0.031) (0.030)
General Economic Sentiment
(Stay the Same)
Get a Lot Better 0.747*** 2.110 0.093 1.097
(0.072) (0.080)
Get a Little Better 0.304*** 1.355 0.151*** 1.163
(0.027) (0.029)
Get a Little Worse –0.163*** 0.849 –0.170*** 0.843
(0.025) (0.024)
Get a Lot Worse –0.493*** 0.611 –0.615*** 0.541
(0.044) (0.035)
Monthly Dummies YES YES
N 50,570 50,570
–2 Log Likelihood 57106.596 61313.739
Nagelkerke R2 0.064 0.057
Hosmer Lemeshow Test (p value) 0.036 0.500
* p < 0.1;  ** p < 0.05;  *** p < 0.01 (p-values for Wald test of βi = 0).added that measures sentiment regarding the outlook specifically for the
household’s finances. 
Coefficients from the three logistic regression models are provided in Table
5, in similar fashion to Table 4. For household spending, there is a consistent
gradient across the inflation perception categories. Those who underestimate
inflation are less likely to state an intention to rein in spending than those
who perceive inflation accurately, while those who overestimate it are more
likely to state the intention to do so, especially if they overestimate inflation
by more than 10 percentage points. In the second model, overestimating
inflation has a substantial and significant association with the intention to
buy a car – those perceiving high inflation are less inclined to buy. In both
cases, levels of general economic and personal financial sentiment are
significant. 
We suggest that these two models of consumption intentions, relating to
household spending and car purchase, while controlling for general and
personal economic outlook, constitute evidence that the misperception of
inflation is likely to affect individual economic decision-making. They are
consistent with the hypothesis that individuals who perceive inflation to be
higher also think consumption is less affordable or offers less value for money.
If the stronger influence of inflation misperception on behaviour were via
perceptions of real interest rates, one might expect intention to purchase a car,
in particular, to be positively related to overestimation.
The third model in Table 5 makes us more inclined to conclude that
misperception is likely to affect behaviour. Intention to buy a house is not
significantly associated with inflation perceptions, although like the other
dependent variables described in this section it is strongly associated with
economic optimism. We believe this result makes sense: households
understand that the factors affecting house prices are different from those
affecting prices generally. Furthermore, if our variable for inflation
perceptions were acting as a proxy for some other form of economic confidence
not controlled for by our variables for general and personal optimism, or for
some unobserved psychological trait, we would anticipate that it would show
up as significant in this third model. Its insignificance therefore reinforces our
contention that the associations between inflation misperceptions, attitudes
and intended behaviour, are meaningful. 
Still, although the effects we report here are highly statistically
significant, some caution is appropriate. For instance, it could be argued that
those who perceive inflation accurately are more financially literate and so
more likely to state intentions with confidence. The failure to find a significant
effect of misperceptions on house prices again offers a degree of reassurance
here. Alternatively, at least in some of the models, causality might run in the
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Table 5: Logistic Regression for Behavioural Intentions Regarding Household
Spending, Car Purchases and House
Cut Household  Buy Car in Buy House in
Spending Next Two Years Next Two Years
β (s.e.) exp (β) β (s.e.) exp (β) β (s.e.) exp (β)
Sociodemographic Controls





Interactions YES YES YES
Inflation Perception (Accurate)
Underestimate (>1% pts.  –0.167*** 0.847 –0.038 0.962 0.030 1.031
below CPI) (0.038) (0.034) (0.051)
Modest Overestimate 0.059* 1.061 –0.055* 0.946 0.042 1.043
(>2% pts. above CPI) (0.030) (0.028) (0.041)
Large Overestimate 0.198*** 1.219 –0.156*** 0.855 –0.011 0.989
(>10% pts. above CPI) (0.031) (0.029) (0.044)
General Economic Sentiment
(Stay the Same)
Get a Lot Better 0.072 1.074 0.275*** 1.317 0.431*** 1.539
(0.082) (0.077) (0.102)
Get a Little Better –0.122*** 0.885 0.114*** 1.121 0.141*** 1.152
(0.030) (0.027) (0.040)
Get a Little Worse 0.043* 1.044 –0.021 0.979 0.014 1.014
(0.025) (0.024) (0.036)




Get a Lot Better –0.123 0.884 0.425*** 1.529 0.875*** 2.400
(0.097) (0.084) (0.092)
Get a Little Better –0.095** 0.909 0.221*** 1.247 0.272*** 1.312
(0.030) (0.026) (0.036)
Get a Little Worse 0.252*** 1.287 –0.207*** 0.813 –0.040 0.961
(0.026) (0.026) (0.041)
Get a Lot Worse 0.572*** 1.772 –0.490*** 0.613 –0.129 0.879
(0.054) (0.064) (0.100)
Monthly Dummies YES YES YES
N 50,570 50,570 50,570
–2 Log Likelihood 57552.675 61638.760 32815.826
Nagelkerke R2 0.037 0.132 0.164
Hosmer Lemeshow Test (p value) 0.385 0.092 0.281
* p < 0.1;  ** p < 0.05;  *** p < 0.01 (p-values for Wald test of βi = 0).opposite direction to that suggested, e.g. someone who intends to buy a car in
the near future might conceivably keep a closer eye on prices than someone
who does not (Lindén, 2005). On the other hand, it should also be noted that
because the models control for economic pessimism, which itself may be
influenced by misperception of inflation, the true impact of misperception on
behaviour may actually be underestimated here, i.e. increased pessimism
about the future is one potential causal route by which the overestimation of
inflation might influence behaviour. 
Overall, the pattern across the models is consistent with the idea that
perceptions of price rises have a systematic impact on economic behaviour,
while the direction of the relationship suggests that people associate perceived
inflation with erosion of income and/or poor value for money. We consider it
likely, therefore, that the misperception of inflation by Irish consumers has
consequences for individuals and the wider economy.
VI DISCUSSION
The present analysis confirms that inflation perceptions in Ireland display
the same empirical pattern as has been observed elsewhere. Inflation is, on
average, substantially overestimated – more so in the years immediately
following the Euro cash changeover. Furthermore, there is a wide dispersion
of perceptions, containing both overestimates and underestimates, with less
than 15 per cent of the population perceiving inflation to be within 2
percentage points of the contemporaneous figure for the CPI. 
Our empirical analysis cannot distinguish between most of the various
hypotheses put forward to explain the overestimation of inflation. The
direction of the relationship between age and perceptions does suggest that
there is more to the phenomenon than a bias in the direction of previous
experience, e.g. whether one lived through the 1970s. More likely, then, is that
psychological biases come into play, be it the salience of specific price changes,
loss aversion or biased memory for past prices, although we also note that the
distribution of actual inflation is itself subject to a right skew.
Our results provide a new perspective on the different inflation
perceptions of social groups. The findings suggest that whatever forces
underlie the overestimation of price rises across the population may not also
be behind the differences recorded between social groups, since women and
those in lower socioeconomic groups are more likely to underestimate as well
as to overestimate inflation. The findings are consistent with the perspective
that psychological biases tend to cause overestimation, while better knowledge
of official figures is likely to reduce both overestimation and the dispersion of
160 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWperceptions within a more knowledgeable social group. Our analysis also
suggests that groups with more reason to be cognisant of official figures (e.g.
people more likely to manage their own household finances) tend to have more
accurate perceptions.
Yet the more novel contribution of this paper is to relate misperceptions of
inflation to attitudes and intentions with respect to future economic
behaviour. Misperceptions are associated with attitudes to both consumption
and saving. More tellingly, overestimation of inflation is related to intentions
to reduce consumption in the coming year. Thus, many people misperceive
inflation substantially and it seems that this misperception may well
influence their economic decision-making.
Taking a wider perspective, the empirical investigation of inflation
expectations and perceptions began in earnest following the rational
expectations revolution. At least for the population generally, it is not easy to
reconcile the systematic misperception of inflation with the rational
expectations approach. Of course, it may be the case that the minority of
people involved in decisions of greater importance to the macroeconomy, such
as wage negotiators or those who lend and borrow on a large scale, are the
same minority of people who perceive inflation accurately. A positive
relationship between accuracy of perception and its importance for the specific
decisions faced by the individual concerned would be in line with the
principles of bounded rationality. 
Nevertheless, we think it very likely, given the results above, that a
substantial proportion of consumer decision-making does not take inflation
into account as the assumption of economic rationality, bounded or otherwise,
suggests it should. Very many people substantially misperceive price rises, in
an environment where the costs of obtaining accurate information are very
small. Furthermore, their misperception appears to have behavioural
consequences. This suggests that concerns about variability in financial
literacy across social groups (Braunstein and Welch, 2002; de Meza,
Irlenbusch and Reyniers, 2008) are not misplaced.
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